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This essay is dedicated to my canine 
companions, Bandit, Stratton, Emma, 
Tedwyn, and Robert, who will always have 
a safe place in my lifeboat. 
Introduction 
In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan posits the 
following hypothetical: five survivors-four normal 
adults and one normal dog-are on a lifeboat. There is 
room in the boat only for four, and one of the occupants 
must be thrown overboard. Regan maintains that his 
rights theory provides an answer to the problem. 
Although death is a harm for the dog, Regan argues, 
death would be a qualitatively greater loss, and, 
accordingly, a greater harm, for any of the humans: "To 
throw anyone of the humans overboard, to face certain 
death, would be to make that individual worse-off (Le., 
would cause tlult individual a greater harm) than the 
harm that would be done to the dog if the animal was 
thrown overboard.") It would, on Regan's view, be 
morally obligatory to kill the dog. Further, Regan 
claims even if the choice is between a million dogs 
and one person, it would still be obligatory under rights 
theory to throw the dogs overboard. 
This notion of comparable harm is not unique to 
Regan although different theorists use it in different 
ways. Other theorists who subscribe to some version 
of animal rights share Regan's view. For example, Joel 
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Feinberg argues that although animals have rights, the 
rights position is consistent with holding "that an 
individual human life as such is a thing of far greater 
value than an individual animal life as such."2 This view 
is also shared by those who work outside the rights 
paradigm; indeed, one of the few points of similarity 
between Regan's rights theory and the utilitarian theory 
of Peter Singer is that although both rely heavily on 
normative notions of equality, both appeal to the notion 
that some beings have qualitatively different and 
ultimately more valuable experience for purposes of 
resolving conflicts between beings who have moral 
standing. For example, Singer argues that "we can make 
sense of the idea that the life of one kind of animal 
possesses greater value than the life of another; and if 
this is so, then the claim that the life of every being has 
equal value is on very weak ground."3 
Reliance on notions of comparable value and harm 
by Regan, Feinberg, and Singer has occasioned critical 
reactions by friend and foe alike. For example, 
philosopher S. F. Sapontzis, who argues in favor of 
including animals as members of the moral community, 
takes issue with the hierarchical status of humans 
implied by the notion of comparable harm. Humans 
undoubtedly can experience things that animals cannot, 
but the opposite is true as well: "We cannot enjoy the 
life of a dog, a bird, a bat, or a dolphin."4 Accordingly, 
we cannot use species alone to make judgments of 
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relative harm to resolve conflicts between humans and 
nonhumans without being guilty of the very speciesism 
that is the foundation of animal exploitation. 
Peter Carruthers, who rejects the moral standing of 
animals, similarly bases his argument in very large part 
on Regan's and Singer's willingness to argue that human 
experience is such that humans generally suffer greater 
harm than do animals when humans are foreclosed from 
satisfying opportunities. Carruthers argues that we have 
a common-sense moral view that human life cannot be 
weighed against animal life that is so strong that even 
Regan and Singer affirm the validity of this view. 
Carruthers maintains that the moral theory that is most 
comfortably consistent with this common-sense view 
is some form of contractualism that would exclude 
animals from the moral community because animals 
are not rational agents.5 
Ironically, one of Regan's most vocal critics is 
Singer, who claims that a "theory that tells us that all 
subjects-of-a-life (including dogs) have equal inherent 
value [cannot] be reconciled with the intuition that it 
is the dog that must be sacrificed."6 Singer argues that 
because Regan maintains that, in the lifeboat example, 
his theory would allow for the killing of a million dogs 
as well, Regan's theory would permit more animal use 
than Singer explicitly acknowledges would be permitted 
at least in theory under utilitarianism. Singer denies that 
individual capacities (intelligence, awareness) playa 
role in his assessments about the morality of imposing 
pain on animals although Singer's construction of 
"interests" is heavily dependent on those capacities. 
Singer thinks that dependence on these capacities may 
cut in favor of the animal (Le., we ought to attach 
greater interest to the animal's interest in avoiding 
pain or suffering because tile animal may feel greater 
fear than a human because of different cognitive 
capacities), but that is irrelevant. The point is that 
whether it does cut in favor of the animal or not is an 
empirical question, and Singer's theory allows for those 
capacities to matter and cannot delimit only those whose 
application will favor nonhumans. Singer explicitly 
relies on capacities in resolving issues about the morality 
of killing animals. This leads him to the view that since 
most farm animals, in Singer's view, are incapable 
cognitively of grasping that they have a "life," they 
can be consumed by humans if they are raised entirely 
outside of the practices known collectively as "factory 
farming" or as "intensive agriculture," and if they are 
slaughtered painlessly.7 
Between the Species 
The use of comparable harm analysis presents 
serious difficulties for any theory that seeks to expand 
in any significant way the protection accorded to 
nonhumans. These difficulties affect both deontological 
and consequentialist theories (albeit in different ways). 
I will, for the most part, confine my remarks to Regan's 
theory in which the notion of comparable harm is 
central. I will first set out the context in which Regan 
develops his views on comparable harm. I will then 
explore the implications of the notion of comparable 
harm for rights theory. I will argue that Regan's 
resolution of the lifeboat example is inconsistent with 
a radical egalitarian theory, but I will suggest a reading 
of Regan's theory that places the lifeboat example in a 
different theoretical context. 
Equal Inherent Value and Comparable Harm 
The central part of Regan's rights argument begins with 
his introduction of the postulate that moral agents have 
a distinct moral value-inherent value-that is separate 
from any intrinsic value such as pleasure or preference 
satisfaction. This notion of inherent value is presented 
by Regan as the primary alternative to the utilitarian 
notion that individuals are receptacles whose value may 
be determined by aggregating the intrinsic value that 
attaches to their experience. Inherent value is also an 
alternative to perfectionist ethics. Moral agents with 
inherent value must possess that value equally or else 
the notion of inherent value may collapse into one of 
the "pernicious"g perfectionist theories of justice 
"according to which what individuals are due, as a 
matter of justice, depends on the degree to which they 
possess a certain cluster of virtues or excellences, 
including intellectual and artistic talents and a character 
that expresses itself in the performance of heroic or 
magnificent deeds."9 Perfectionist theories are 
objectionable not only because they provide the 
"foundation of the most objectionable forms of social, 
political, and legal discrimination" but also because 
"[w]hether individuals have the talent necessary to 
acquire the favored virtues (e.g., ability to do higher 
mathematics) is beyond their control."lO 
The attribution of equal inherent value to at least 
some moral patients (all normal manlffials aged one year 
or more) is required because both agents and patients 
are subjects-of-a-life; that is, agents and patients are 
conscious, and possess a complex awareness (including 
beliefs and desires and an ability to pursue and satisfy 
82 Summer & Fall 1995 
Comparable Harm and Equal Inherent Worth: The Problem ofDog in the Lifeboat 
them) and psychophysical identity over time. Agents 
and patients may be harmed or benefited and have a 
welfare in that their experiential life fares well or ill for 
them, independently of the utility that they have for 
others or the interest that others have in them. Being a 
subject-of-a-life is not only a sufficient condition for 
having inherent value but is also a criterion that allows 
for the intelligible and nonarbitrary attribution of equal 
inherent value to moral agents and moral patients, 
including nonhumans. Regan stresses that there is no 
nonarbitrary way to separate moral agents from moral 
patients and that there is no nonarbitrary way of 
differentiating nonhuman moral patients from their 
human counterparts. 
Regan's respect principle, a predistributive formal 
principle, requires that we treat those who have inherent 
value in ways that respect that value and holds that no 
individual with inherent value may be treated solely as 
a means to an end in order to maximize the aggregate 
of desirable consequences. From the respect principle 
we may derive the harm principle, which holds that, as 
a primafacie matter, harming the interests of a subject-
of-a-life is showing disrespect for the inherent value of 
the moral agent or patient. In light of the prima facie 
nature of the obligations imposed by the harm principle, 
it is necessary to determine under what circumstances 
inflicting harm on moral agents or patients will be 
permitted. It is in this context that the notion of 
comparable harm becomes relevant. 
Regan distinguishes two types of harm: harms that 
are inflictions and harms that are deprivations. "Acute 
or chronic physical or psychological suffering is the 
paradigm of a harm understood as an infliction."1l 
Deprivations involve"losses of those benefits thatmake 
possible or enlarge the sources of satisfaction in life."12 
According to Regan, "whatever the category, not all 
harms are equal."13 Harms are comparable "when they 
detract equally from an individual's welfare, or from 
the welfare of two or more individuals."14 Similarly, 
harms may not be comparable in those instances in 
which there are differential effects on the welfare of 
morally relevant beings. Although we may assume that 
there is a "strong presumption" that "like harms have 
like effect," the realities of individual variability 
require recognition that like harm may detract 
differently from individual welfare and may not be 
counted as comparable.J5 
1bis notion of comparable harm is the foundation 
for the two general principles that Regan uses to resolve 
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conflicts. The "miniride" principle, which assumes that 
the morally innocent individuals involved will be harmed 
in a prima facie comparable way, holds that in such 
situations (and in the absence of special considerations) 
we should choose to override the rights of the few rather 
than to override the rights of the many.16 The "worse-
off' principle, which assumes that the morally innocent 
individuals involved will suffer non-comparable harm, 
holds that in such situations (and in the absence ofspecial 
considerations) we should choose to override the rights 
of the many when the "harm faced by the few would 
make them worse off than any of the many would be if 
any other option were chosen."I? 
So, the notion of comparable harm (and its related 
concepts) plays a significant role in Regan's theory, 
since it specifies the circumstances under which harm 
may be inflicted on subjects-of-a-life, all of whom 
possess equal inherent value. In this context, Regan 
discusses the admittedly exceptional case of the four 
humans and the dog (or a million dogs) in the lifeboat. 
The dog has inherent value; indeed, according to 
Regan, the dog has inherent value that is equal to that 
possessed by her human co-passengers. Both the dog 
and the humans have a prima facie right not to be 
harmed. The decision to throw the dog overboard is 
not speciesist, Regan argues, because the decision to 
sacrifice the dog is not based on species membership 
but rather, "on assessing the losses each individual faces 
and assessing these losses equitably."18 There is no 
aggregating of harms in that the rights view would 
require throwing one million dogs overboard to save 
the four humans. Although the dogs are subordinated 
to the humans, this does not mean that there should be 
any "routine subordination of the less virtuous by those 
who are more virtuous, so that the latter may develop 
their virtues optimally. The rights view disallows such 
subordination."19 The lifeboat case is an exceptional 
case and "what the rights view implies should be done 
in exceptional cases... cannot fairly be generalized to 
unexceptional cases."20 
Harm as an Empirical Matter, "Routine" 
Subordination, and the ''Exceptional'' Case 
From the above description ofcertain aspects ofRegan's 
theory, it is clear that Regan very explicitly rejects any 
sort of perfectionism in favor of radical egalitarianism. 
Regan's postulate of equal inherent value is, according 
to Regan's own description, "categorical" and 
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"admitting of no degrees."21 That is, Regan rejects the 
notion that individuals can have different degrees of 
inherent value: "If moral agents are viewed as having 
inherent value to varying degrees, then there would have 
to be some basis for determining how much inherent 
value any given moral agent has."22 A theory of differing 
levels of inherent value would risk reliance on some 
version of perfectionism, which Regan rejects. 
In addition, the attribution of equal inherent value 
to moral agents and moral patients alike rests on the 
notion of the subject-of-a-life, which Regan also 
recognizes as categorical.23 Indeed, the concept must 
be categorical; if beings could possess status as a 
subject-of-a-life to varying degrees, then it might be 
possible that only moral agents-and not moral 
patients-would have that status. But Regan rejects 
this notion in favor of an egalitarian criterion that "does 
not assert or imply that those who meet it have the 
status of subject of a life to a greater or lesser degree, 
depending on the degree to which they have or lack 
some favored ability or virtue (e.g., the ability for 
higher mathematics or those virtues associated with 
artistic excellence). One either is a subject of a life, in 
the sense explained, or one is not. All those who are, 
are so equally."24 
In order to be a subject-of-a-life, a being need only 
be sentient, possess beliefs and desires (and an ability 
to act in pursuit of desires and goals), perception, 
memory, a psychophysical identity over time, emotional 
life, and experiential welfare that is better or worse 
depending on what happens to that being. Because both 
moral agents and moral patients are subjects-of-a-life 
"one cannot nonarbitrarily maintain that how much 
inherent value moral agents have depends on the degrees 
to which they possess the virtues in question or on how 
much utility for others they have,"25 
Although both equal inherent value and the criterion 
used to attribute that value to moral agents and moral 
patients are categorical, the concept ofharm apparently 
is not categorical, in that Regan allows supposed 
differences between humans and nonhumans to rebut 
the "strong presumption" that "like harms have like 
effects." As between the human and nonhuman 
occupants of the lifeboat, the same harm is deemed to 
be qualitatively different. Regan defends his theory of 
comparable harm in three ways. First, he maintains that 
there is, as an empirical matter, a difference between 
the harm suffered by the human and the same harm 
suffered by a nonhuman. Second, he argues that 
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perfectionist ethical theories would permit "the routine 
subordination of the less virtuous by those who are more 
virtuous."26 Third, he argues that "prevention cases, 
including lifeboat cases, are exceptional cases:>27 
I want to discuss briefly the empirical nature of 
harm determinations, the notion of "routine" 
subordination, and the problem of identifying 
"exceptional" circumstances. 
(a) harm as an empirical matter 
Regan regards both the postulate of equal inherent value 
and the criterion used to attribute that value to moral 
agents and patients (all subjects-of-a-life) as categorical 
and admitting of no degrees whatsoever. Harm, 
however, is different Although there is obvious overlap, 
we can, as an empirical matter, identify at least two 
types of harm-inflictions and deprivations-and we 
may, also as an empirical matter, judge that different 
rightholders may be affected in different ways by the 
same type of harm. 
The problem with regarding harm as an empirical 
matter is that it involves a different analysis from that 
involved in the formulation of Regan's theoretical 
postulates. Not only is it difficult as an empirical matter 
to make some of the assessments that need to be made 
to compare harms, but, more important, any such 
consideration of supposed empirical facts about harm 
in this regard is inconsistent with what it is necessary 
to disregard in the formulation of those theoretical 
postulates. Regan carefully constructs his postulate of 
equal inherent value so that it excludes any notion of 
individual characteristics or what may be thought to be 
virtues in a perfectionist theory. Similarly, his subject-
of-a-life criterion similarly excludes any notion of 
individual characteristic or virtue apart from those 
characteristics-sentience, beliefs, desires, psycho-
physical identity over time-that are constitutive of 
subject-of-a-life status. In light of the obvious empirical 
differences among human beings, and between humans 
and animals, Regan could have developed a concept of 
"subject" that reflected those differences. But he 
avoided these characteristics in favor of categorical 
theoretical notions that disregarded as irrelevant the 
existence of these empirical differences. 
If the status of being a subject-of-a-life is, as Regan 
argues, an all-or-nothing proposition, then all such 
subjects must be equal for purposes of deciding at least 
those conflicts that involve interests protected under 
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the rights theory. Ifall rightholders have inherent value 
because to accord them differential value would lead 
to perfectionism, and if moral agents and patients alike 
have this equal value because to accord them differential 
value would lead to perfectionism, then accepting a 
theory of comparable harm based at least in part on the 
presence or absence of certain virtues may be the same 
as arguing that the being who is harmed less has an 
inherent value that is different from, and less than, the 
one harmed more. Indeed, in Singer's theory, the 
different quality of experience is used primarily to 
determine relative value of different beings and not to 
differentiate the varying degrees of harm suffered by 
beings with the same inherent value.28 
(b) "routine" subordination 
Part of the difficulty surrounding the notion of 
comparable harm is related to ambiguity involving 
precisely what constitutes "routine" subordination and 
when we have an "exceptional" case. When Regan says 
that the lifeboat example does not involve the "routine" 
subordination of one subject of a life to another, he 
means that the principle that we should favor humans 
over the dog is not one that we should apply save in 
"exceptional" circumstances. A routine subordination 
in unexceptional cases would likely represent some 
form of perfectionism. Indeed, Regan argues that the 
postulate of equal inherent value is acceptable because 
it avoids the "wildly inegalitarian implications of 
perfectionist theories."29 Moreover, Regan rejects any 
attempt to argue that moral patients (including 
nonhumans) have less inherent value than moral agents 
on the grounds that such an argument would require, 
inter alia, reliance on perfectionist notions such as 
intellect or artistic ability, etc. 30 
The problem is that even if the lifeboat example is 
the only or the primary example of the "exceptional" 
case, it still represents a form of perfectionism. If, for 
example, all cases were lifeboat (or otherwise 
"exceptional") cases, and all of these exceptional cases 
involved normal, healthy humans and normal, healthy 
dogs, then the prescription for resolving those cases 
would require that we regard the harm to the dogs as 
incomparable with the harm suffered by the humans 
because of a supposed excellence enjoyed by the latter 
to a greater degree: humans have a qualitatively greater 
opportunity for satisfaction that is foreclosed by action 
that is detrimental to them. 
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Regan argues that even in the lifeboat case, the 
decision to kill the dog is not based on any appeal to 
perfectionist theories but, rather, is based on consid-
eration of the equal inherent value and equal prima 
facie right not to be harmed. Although Regan may be 
correct to argue that his resolution of the lifeboat 
example does not appeal explicitly to perfectionism 
as advocating the routine subordination of right-
holders, his resolution does appeal to a supposed 
human "excellence" (the ability to pursue oppor-
tunities for satisfaction). But to say that this virtue 
may be appealed to only in exceptional cases is 
nevertheless to say that in that class ofcases, there is 
routine subordination based on a supposed virtue 
possessed by one class of rightholders. 
(c) "exceptional" circumstances 
The third problem involved in using comparable-harm 
analysis involves delineating those circumstances in 
which the analysis will apply. Although Regan talks of 
"exceptional" circumstances, it appears as though the 
miniride and worse-off principles are intended to be 
principles to resolve conflict as a general matter. And, 
in morality, conflict is the rule and not the exception. 
To the extent, then, that comparable-harm analysis is 
to be applied in any situation of conflict between or 
among rightholders, then the result in the lifeboat 
situation portends difficulties for an animal rights 
theory. The use ofa putative human excellence to justify 
the killing of the dog in the lifeboat example opens 
the door to perfectionist ethical theory in that any such 
consideration, it seems, detracts from the notion of equal 
inherent value, which rests, at least in part,. on the notion 
that possession of inherent value depends only on the 
status of the individual as a subject-of-a-life with 
consciousness, complex awareness, and a psycho-
physical identity over time. To the extent that we 
regard harms to normal, healthy rightholders as 
incomparable, we depart from the presumption that 
Regan establishes that we should assume that like 
harms have like effects on rightholders. 
Even if, however, the comparable-harm analysis 
applies only to truly "exceptional" cases, it is difficult 
to know exactly what cases are covered. For example, 
Sapontzis argues that it is improper to use animals in 
medical experiments except when animal use (and 
perhaps the use of comatose or terminally ill humans) 
is "necessary for and greatly outweighed by some clear 
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and present, massive, desperately needed good."31 
How close is this situation to the lifeboat example? 
Does it qualify as an "exceptional" case? If so, it would 
seem that even a rights advocate could justify using 
animals (or "marginal" humans) based on the differ-
ential "excellence" possessed by normal humans whose 
use for the purpose would foreclose more opportunities 
for satisfaction. 
The preceding discussion indicates that a reliance 
on comparable-harm analysis is problematic not only 
because it may entail speciesist conclusions. Let us 
return to the lifeboat. There are five survivors-all 
human. Four of the survivors possess some sort of 
extraordinary talent---one is a gifted musician, one a 
genius mathematician, etc. The fifth survivor is a 
normal, healthy adult who works at a minimum wage 
job and possesses no special skill or talent. If we can 
depart from the assumption that like harms have like 
effects when the fifth passenger is a dog, why not 
assume that the like harm of death will have a different 
impact on the four talented survivors than it will on the 
fifth untalented survivor because death for the former 
will foreclose opportunities for satisfaction in a way 
that it will not for the latter? 
''Exceptional'' Circumstances and Basic Rights 
There is, however, an important sense in which the real 
difficulty with the lifeboat example is that Regan 
mentions it at all. Although Regan thought that his 
general theory of animal rights provided an answer for 
the lifeboat situation, he may have made the mistake of 
confusing a question concerning the rights that animals 
would have in a situation in which animal rightholders 
had a conflict with human rightholders with a general 
theory that concerned only the question of whether 
animals had a single right not to be treated solely as 
means to ends. 
It is my view that Regan never intended The Case 
for Animal Rights as an exhaustive analysis of every 
issue-including how to resolve conflicts between 
rightholders-that flowed from the recognition that 
animals have rights. Regan's primary focus was on 
the violation of animal rights through their treatment 
solely as means to human ends in institutionalized 
exploitation represented by factory farming, vivi-
section, and animal use for clothing and entertainment. 
That is, Regan argued that animals ought to be included 
in the class of rightholders, and that in order for 
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membership in this class, it is necessary that we 
recognize the basic right of animals not to be treated 
as property, or, as Regan puts it, not to be treated 
exclusively as means to human ends. 
Although the notions of "basic" and "absolute" 
rights are discussed in much philosophical literature, 
its most lucid presentation for present purposes may be 
found in the analysis presented by Professor Henry Shue 
in his book, Basic Rights.32 According to Shue, a basic 
right is not a right that is "more valuable or intrinsically 
more satisfying to enjoy than some other rights."33 
Rather, a right is a basic right when "any attempt to 
enjoy any other right by sacrificing the basic right would 
be quite literally self-defeating, cutting the ground from 
beneath itself." Shue states that "non-basic rights may 
be sacrificed, if necessary, in order to secure the basic 
right. But the protection of a basic right may not be 
sacrificed in order to secure the enjoyment of a non-
basic right." The reason for this is that a basic right 
"cannot be sacrificed successfully. If the right sacrificed 
is indeed basic, then no right for which it might be 
sacrificed can actually be enjoyed in the absence of the 
basic right. The sacrifice would prove self-defeating." 
Shue emphasizes that basic rights are a prerequisite to 
the enjoyment and exercise of non-basic rights, and that 
the possession of non-basic rights in the absence ofbasic 
rights is nothing more than the possession of rights "in 
some merely legalistic or otherwise abstract sense 
compatible with being unable to make any use of the 
substance of the right."34 
In order for animals to enjoy any rights at all, it is 
first necessary that they stop being regarded as "things" 
which, as a matter of law and (some) moral theories, 
cannot have rights. For example, the law regards 
animals as property, and "legal relations in our law exist 
only between persons. There cannot be a legal relation 
between a person and a thing or between two things."35 
Property "cannot have rights or duties or be bound by 
or recognize rules."36 Regan's enterprise may be 
understood as an argument in favor of the single, basic 
right not to be regarded as property. Aright to be treated 
as a moral and legal person is perhaps the most basic 
right in that personhood is a necessary condition of 
having relations at all in any normative system that 
distinguishes between persons and things. 
Regan's theory of animal rights is similar to 
theories about the abolition of human slavery, which 
concerned the basic right of human beings not to be 
regarded as the property of others. Those who opposed 
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slavery argued that it was morally wrong to treat 
human beings exclusively as means to the ends of other 
humans. But the abolitionist position did not entail 
what particular rights would be possessed by the 
liberated slaves-{)ther than the basic right not to be 
regarded as property. Regan is concerned about 
institutionalized animal exploitation, and it is this 
concern that led him to reject "routine" subordination 
and to use of the miniride and worse-off principles in 
only "exceptional" circumstances. 
An important part of Regan's theory is that all 
forms of institutionalized exploitation of animals 
violate the respect and harm principles because they 
fail to treat individuals as possessing equal inherent 
value, and rely on some form of utilitarian or 
perfectionist thought. For example, a slave owner 
could not rely on the worse-off or miniride principles 
to complain ofharm when a slave was liberated against 
the owner's will. In this sense, then, Regan might have 
a way of distinguishing exceptional or extraordinary 
cases from most others in that some involve institution-
alized animal exploitation that Regan would argue is 
from the outset violative of animal rights. Regan's 
theory would conceptually prevent there being a 
conflict from the outset in such situations. Regan could 
argue consistently that rights theory conceptually 
prevents our making any sort of comparable-harm 
determination in the context of animal use (or the use 
of "defective" humans) to find a cure for the most 
serious epidemic. Such animal use would entail 
institutions that are inherently exploitative of animals 
because they regard animals solely as means to human 
ends. This option is not open to Singer, who, if he is 
to be consistent, must inquire as to whether any 
exploitation-institutionalized or not-is justified by 
the principle of utility. For Singer, all cases are lifeboat 
cases. For Regan, exceptional cases exclude the 
institutionalized treatment of rightholders solely as 
means to the ends of others. 
If this interpretation of Regan is correct, then two 
things are now clear. First, it was wholly unnecessary 
for Regan even to discuss the lifeboat example. 
Regan applies the miniride and worse-off principles 
to the lifeboat example, which, by Regan's own and 
explicit account, indiCates that we are dealing with a 
situation in which there is no institutionalized 
exploitation operative, so the case does not concern 
the matter that is the primary subject of Regan's 
analysis. Regan's resolution of the lifeboat example 
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is not required by his overall theory because the 
lifeboat example concerns a very different context-
the resolution of a conflict between two rightholders-
from the one that occupies Regan's attention 
throughout The Case for AnimalRights-the inclusion 
of nonhumans in the class of rightholders. Regan 
thought that his general theory provided an answer to 
the lifeboat situation, and this may have resulted from 
confusing issues concerning conflicts between 
rightholders with issues concerning membership in the 
class of potential rightholders. 
Second, to the extent that Regan's (unnecessary) 
resolution of the problem requires the use of some 
form of perfectionism, such a requirement is 
problematic for Regan's overall theory, but not for the 
reasons pointed to by his critics. Regan could say that 
although all beings with inherent value possess that 
value equally for purposes of not treating any being 
exclusively as a means to an end in institutionalized 
exploitation, these beings do not possess the same 
value for purposes of resolving conflicts between 
rightholders. This reflects our intuition that it may be 
permissible to award Mary a scholarship if she is better 
in math than Johnny, but that it is not permissible to 
enslave Johnny for Mary's use simply because he is 
less intelligent than she. 
The problem is that in light of Regan's analysis of 
the lifeboat example, it would seem that he is committed 
to resolving virtually every human/animal conflict in 
favor of the human. This does not, as some have 
suggested, mean that he is on a slippery slope back to 
vivisection. On the contrary, Regan can claim that the 
respect principle is always violated in cases of institu-
tionalized exploitation. But it does give nonhumans a 
somewhat pyrrhic victory. Animals may no longer be 
regarded as property, but their interests will nevertheless 
not prevail most of the time because the characteristics 
upon which we relied to justify their property status 
will now be used to resolve any conflict that they may 
have as rightholders with a human rightholder. 
Once animals are no longer treated as property, then 
it will become necessary to determine what particular 
rights are or should be possessed by animals. At this 
juncture, it may be permissible to take the presence or 
absence of certain virtues to resolve conflicts between 
or among rightholders. It is, however, problematic to 
say that rights theory requires that we throw the dog-
or a million dogs-{)verboard, just as it would be 
problematic to say that a human rights theory about the 
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abolition of human slavery requires that we always 
throw overboard the human with the least intelligence. 
Perfectionism in the context of deciding issues or 
conflicts involving at least basic rights raises serious 
problems for any theory that rests on a notion of radical 
equality. My ability to do mathematics may legitimately 
be used to decide whether I get a math scholarship; that 
ability is irrelevant to whether, in a situation of famine, 
I should get the one remaining crust of bread. Respect 
for my basic or fundamental rights (however under-
stood) should not, on a radical egalitarian view, depend 
on my virtues, which are, in any event, out ofmy control 
for the most part. To the extent that Regan links even 
basic rights (other than the right not to be property) 
with the possession of certain "virtues," he allows for 
differential consideration of equal inherent value. Such 
differential consideration would not justify using 
animals in experiments or otherwise relegating them 
to property status, but it might very well mean that 
animals will continue to lose in virtually every 
situation in which their "rights" were found to conflict 
with those of humans. 
In order for Regan to escape this difficulty, he needs 
a theory about basic rights other than the right not to be 
property. Once individuals are determined to possess 
equal inherent value, then any conflict involving basic 
or fundamental rights ought to be decided without 
reference to any particular "virtue," which is what 
comparable harm analysis prescribes.37 Alternatively, 
Regan needs a theory about why the basic right not to 
be property is different from other basic rights. Regan 
would have to defend the notion that the harm of being 
treated exclusively as a means to an end is somehow 
different in a morally significant way from the harm of 
being deprived of other basic rights. One possible 
option is for Regan to argue that the right not to be 
property is the most basic of all rights because as long 
as a being is characterized as property, that being will 
be unable to enjoy those other rights as protected 
interests if virtually all interests are considered as 
tradable. 'The problem is that Regan never addressed 
this issue and never explicitly recognized that his theory 
was more about the abolition of animal slavery than a 
general theory of rights that animals would possess once 
they were no longer regarded as human property. 
Moreover, it is not clear that such a difference would 
be significant morally in comparison to deprivation of 
other basic rights, such as a minimal right of physical 
security or minimal subsistence. 
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Conclusion 
In sum, the observation that Singer, Carruthers, and 
others have made of Regan's theory-that the lifeboat 
example sinks, as it were, the whole theory because it 
allows for a necessary compromise of the categorical 
nature of Regan's concepts of equal inherent value and 
subject-of-a-life---is incorrect. Regan's overall rigbts 
theory is not threatened by his compromise of his 
categorical concepts as long as the "exceptional" 
circumstances in which this compromise can occur are 
limited to those that are identified exclusively by 
reference to those categorical concepts. That is, 
"exceptional" circumstances can never include institu-
tionalized exploitation so, irrespective of the emergency, 
such as a plague, performing animal experiments (a 
form of institutionalized exploitation) would always be 
deemed to violate the respect principle. Regan can retain 
comparable-harm analysis, but he cannot, it seems, 
accept any sort of "perfectionism," even in the 
exceptional case, insofar as basic rights are concerned. 
Regan's resolution of the lifeboat example was 
unnecessary because it did not concern the general 
context of his theory, which involved only the basic 
right not to be treated exclusively as a means to an end. 
The lifeboat example concerns a conflict between 
rightholders. To the extent that in such situations Regan 
would require choosing the human interest over the 
animal interest, it is problematic for his theory because 
it would mean that animals, although no longer 
property, will virtually never prevail in any conflict with 
human rightholders. 38 
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